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"Concerned Retiree" calls me out on Leon Panetta at CIA:

Ms. Rosenberg -- could you perhaps approach this topic -- i.e. Mr. Panetta doesn't appear to have any special substantive experience or knowledge of intelligence gathering, operations or issues - from the OTHER END -- i.e. please speculate and enlighten us on your views on how little substantive experience or knowledge is needed for the CIA Director post.

It's a fair question, and there are a couple of other questions mixed into the longer comment. So I'm going to answer this query by making a couple of numbered points. Bear with me.

1. Experience Matters, But What Kind? "Concerned Retiree" brings up Caroline Kennedy and President-elect Obama as examples of people who are considered good candidates for leadership positions not because of specific work experience, but because of intangible personal qualities.

I don't really think Panetta falls into the same category as Caroline Kennedy. Panetta's served in Congress, as head of an agency, and as White House Chief of Staff. Kennedy has no similar substantive resume. Much has been made of Kennedy's thin answers to written questions to news outlets. Panetta should--and I'm sure he will--face a lot of tough questions about intelligence, his lack of background in it, how his past management experience will apply to the CIA, etc. If he completely flubs his confirmation hearings, that's probably a good indication that he hasn't figured out CIA enough to direct it.

But I think to suggest that Panetta doesn't have relevant experience in any field just because intelligence work is not among the fields where he has a background is misguided. Yes, Panetta has not (that we know of, of course :) ) worked for the CIA. But he has lead an agency staffed mostly by highly specialized and educated experts at a time when that agency had serious morale problems, and a pressing mission (reducing the size of government, and making it more efficient). The CIA is chock-full of highly educated and trained people with specialized skills. Morale in the agency is low for a variety of reasons, a generational transition is under way, and the intelligence community is undergoing community-wide personnel reforms that affect how people are evaluated and what experience they need to get promoted.

In an ideal world, Panetta would be both an intelligence expert, and have had management experience in a situation similar to what he'll need to tackle the challenges at CIA. I think there's not much question that he isn't the former. He does have the latter. Is that enough? I don't really think I'm qualified to make that call.

Continue reading "What Makes Someone Qualified to Serve?" »

In an interview with former Indiana Rep. Tim Roemer, Marc Ambinder gets confirmation of his observation yesterday that dealing with the workforce and morale at CIA will be one of Leon Panetta's biggest challenges as director. Roemer says:

Secondly, one of the key issues is managing the young work force at the CIA, balancing our electronic and satellite capabilities with a human intelligence network that can penetrate some of these groups around the world....The challenge there -- we've got one of the youngest workforces since 9/11 in any of the government agencies... and it's very diversified, and getting more diversified....that's a strength.

Some commentators have noticed that CIA veterans might resent Panetta for overseeing Clinton-era budget cuts at the agency. Others have batted back and forth whether Panetta's lack of intelligence experience matters But if the intelligence workforce is really the most important thing Panetta has to address, it's more important to consider what he's like as a manager, and how he handles major transitions. Because Panetta's taken on a troubled agency with an elite staff before.

This 1994 National Journal profile (If it's under a pay barrier let me know, and I'll try to get it out) of Panetta at the Office of Management and Budget provides an interesting look at how he took on some similar challenges. Obviously, the parallels between OMB and the CIA aren't exact, but the experience does suggest a couple of things about Panetta's management style.

1. He's eager to learn about things he doesn't know very much about. Panetta was a budget expert when he took over at OMB, but he didn't know very much about evaluating performance or about OMB's management division. Nicholas Masters, then a lobbyist who had worked with Panetta on the Budget Committee, is frank in saying Panetta was pretty clueless about management, but that he worked hard to make up for that lack of knowledge.

2. He's willing to shift positions if his first proposal doesn't work. Panetta originally supported separating OMB into two separate offices, one that handled management, and one that handled budget. The budget office was probably overstaffed: of 550 total OMB analysts, 160 at most were working on management. But, as the profile shows, he changed his mind:

Instead of "never the twain shall meet," OMB 2000 fuses management and budget into a single function. As the report, which was signed by Panetta and Rivlin, states, "Having led this institution for over a year ... we are convinced that management is integral to budget and vice versa."

"I thought that you would never be able to integrate the two," Panetta explained. He attributes his change of view in large part to the National Performance Review. "The fact that we were stressing management, and that we were going to cut the equivalent of 272,000 full-time employees (throughout the federal government) gave us the momentum." The issue became one of how to run a smaller and less costly agency. "How do you solve that problem? You scream and bitch a lot, but you have to make it work. That's why we had to bring those two elements into one office."

Obviously, it's been a while since Panetta made the link between budgeting and performance. But unless his beliefs on the matter have changed substantially, understanding that connection means Panetta has already grappled with a challenge that many agencies are only beginning to address. And because he took on performance at OMB, he understands both how that agency's management challenges, and how OMB tries to measure the success or failure of management elsewhere. Does that mean Panetta can fix CIA on day one? Of course not. Does it mean he's a management guru? Probably not either. (No matter what anthems to great managers 30 Rock delivers, no one is a perfect visionary.) But it does mean Panetta's got a sense of what it's like to work in a troubled, unbalanced agency that is trying to realign itself.

Fascinating cover story in Newsweek this week about Thomas M. Tamm, a former Justice Department lawyer who exposed the Bush administration's effort to intercept phone calls and e-mails of people in the United States without court warrants. But it's how he did it that makes it interesting: Tamm went straight to the New York Times, which later published a story exposing the program (based not just on his revelations, it should be noted). He didn't bother with established federal whistleblowing procedures.

Tamm's defenders say he was merely trying to defend the rule of law and expose what he thought was a violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Without his actions, they say, the administration's activities may never have come to light.

Others say going to the media is the wrong approach. "You can't have runoffs deciding they're going to be the white knight and running to the press," Frances Fragos Townsend, told Newsweek. Townsend once headed the Justice unit where Tamm worked and later served as President Bush's chief counterterrorism adviser. "There are legal processes in place for [whistleblowers' complaints]. This is one where I'm a hawk. It offends me, and I find it incredibly dangerous."

I'll admit to a bias in favor of leaks to the media, for obvious reasons. But you can make up your own mind as to whether Tamm is a whistleblowing hero or merely a turncoat.

The issue of professional liability insurance for federal managers hit the mainstream media again Sunday, with a New York Times story about CIA officers who are turning to Wright & Company for policies to cover their legal costs in the event they get hauled into federal court or become ensnared in a congressional investigation.

As the story notes, FBI agents, Secret Service officers, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement employees also have purchased the insurance. They're not the only ones. In the late 1990s, professional liability insurance became popular at the IRS after reform legislation provided a new avenue for agency employees to file complaints against their supervisors.

Exactly who should get the insurance has long been open to question. The Justice Department typically represents federal employees in proceedings resulting from actions taken in the course of their job duties, but some managers see the benefit of having personal representation, too.

In a 1998 report, the Office of Personnel Management found that in the previous five years, only 14 federal employees had been found personally liable in lawsuits brought against them in relation to their government duties. And in only one reported case did an employee actually have to pay damages. The Justice Department reported that it had received about 7,000 requests for representation from federal employees in the same period, and had rejected 150 of those requests, or 2 percent.

The insurance costs about $300 a year, and the government pays half the premium for supervisors and certain other employees.

This week's New Yorker includes an exhaustive profile (not available online) of Mike McConnell, director of national intelligence. Among the thoughts the intelligence community's overseer shared with the magazine's Lawrence Wright:

• On coordinating the efforts of the various intelligence agencies: "I grew up in this community. I served it as a consultant. I'm passionate about it. So this job gives me the opportunity to make a contribution, even to the consternation of the bureaucracies, because I am going to force them to cooperate."


• On his political affiliation: "I'm not a Republican or a Democrat. My worry is good government." And: "I always vote, and I've voted for both parties."


• On the movie The Bourne Ultimatum, in which CIA agents sit at banks of massive computer monitors and have instant access to data and security camera feeds around the world: "Yeah, we can't do that. That's all horse pucky."

Last week the Office of Management and Budget crowed about meeting a deadline to create a publicly accessible Web site to provide data on federal contracts, grants, and loans. The fine print of that announcement noted that the data would cover about 90 percent of federal spending.

So what's in the other 10 percent? That's what we're starting to learn. Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists reports that several defense intelligence agencies have successfully made the case that they should not have to report even unclassified contracting actions to the database due to "operational security isues."

Defense News, Aftergood notes, uncovered a memo from Shay D. Assad, director of Defense procurement and acquisition policy, granting the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and Counterintelligence Field Activity a waiver from reporting requirements, at least for fiscal 2007 and 2008.

"I appreciate your concerns that reporting these actions to the publicly accessible website could provide unacceptable risk of insight to your individual missions and budgets," Assad wrote.

But as Aftergood notes, contracting data from these agencies for previous years will be available on OMB's USAspending.gov site. It's also been available online via other sources for years. So it's a little odd that this information suddenly represents a security risk.

(Hat tip: Government Inc.)

In a speech Friday at the Council on Foreign Relations, CIA Director Gen. Michael Hayden said he has "very deep respect for journalists and for their profession." But then he devoted a healthy chunk of his address to critiquing media coverage of the agency.

"Just as they report on the terrorists, it’s the job of journalists to report on the how the war against terrorism is being fought," Hayden said. "And when their spotlight is cast on intelligence activities, sound judgment and a thorough understanding of all the equities at play are critically important. Revelations of sources and methods -- and an impulse to drag anything CIA does to the darkest corner of the room -- can make it very difficult for us to do our vital work."

"Journalists, on their own, simply don’t have all the facts needed to make the call on whether [intelligence] information can be released without harm," Hayden said. But then he went on to set up something of a Catch-22. The agency, he said, often can't give them that information, either.

"When the media claims an oversight role on our clandestine operations, it does so in an arena where we cannot clarify, explain, or defend our actions without doing further damage to our sources and methods."

The agency's true overseers, Hayden said, are in Congress, which has "full access to our operations and takes our security requirements into account."

For what it's worth, here's my two cents on this issue: I think Hayden has a point that more than a few journalists have a knee-jerk tendency to drag what the CIA or other federal agencies do to the "darkest corner of the room." But let's be honest: The agency has played a role in fostering such cynicism through its own performance historically. And I don't think that journalists should cede their role in overseeing what the CIA does to Congress or anyone else. Because it's simply not unheard of that the people's representatives on Capitol Hill would be complicit in an effort to keep vital information about the agency from the public without valid reason.

Obviously, this is an area that cries out for responsible journalism -- and the agency can help in that effort by doing everything in its power to work with journalists to explain why certain activities must be kept under wraps.

Among the "family jewels" -- documents detailing illegal and scandalous activities by the CIA -- set for release next week, are papers detailing a 1969 program to infiltrate antiwar groups in the United States and monitor their activities. Under the program, 10,000 American names were collected. Why did the agency not only gather but hang onto all of this data? Here's former CIA Director William Colby's explanation, as reported in the Washington Post: "the tendency of bureaucrats to retain paper whether they needed it or acted on it or not."